Speight v. Minor by unknown
2007 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-28-2007 
Speight v. Minor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 
Recommended Citation 
"Speight v. Minor" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 529. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/529 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS





          Appellant
   v.
JONATHAN C. MINOR, Warden
________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. PA. No. 06-CV-01377)
District Judge: The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 27, 2007
Before: SLOVITER, MCKEE and AMBRO, Circuit Judges





Kenneth Eugene Speight, a federal inmate presently confined at FCI-McKean,
Pennsylvania, appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his petition under 28 U.S.C.
  Speight does not challenge the District Court’s determination that the sanctions1
imposed fell well within the BOP Guidelines for high-level offenses set forth at 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.13, tables 3 and 4, and thus were not excessive.
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§ 2241 in which he sought to have a disciplinary action vacated and his good time credits
and phone privileges reinstated.  Speight argues that he was denied due process in
connection with disciplinary charges that falsely accused him of a BOP Code 312 offense,
“insolence toward a staff member,” while he was confined at FCI-Allenwood in White
Deer, Pennsylvania.  He asserts that Counselor Simmons filed the allegedly false charge
against him in retaliation for Speight’s filing a civil rights lawsuit naming fellow officers,
including disciplinary hearing officer (“DHO”) Bittenbinder.  He claims that DHO
Bittenbinder, who presided over his disciplinary hearing prompted by Simmons’s charge,
was biased against him and failed to base his decision against Simmons upon the greater
weight of the evidence.
After reviewing the petition and responsive pleadings, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the petition be dismissed.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and denied § 2241 relief.  The District Court held that “some evidence”
existed to support the disciplinary hearing officer’s finding of guilt based on the
disciplinary report completed by Counselor Simmons.  The District Court also held that
Speight’s retaliation claim should have been brought pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).   Speight timely appealed.1
We have jurisdiction to review the dismissal of Speight’s petition pursuant to 28
3U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal
conclusions.  See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).
Speight argues vigorously that the District Court erred in failing to consider
whether disciplinary sanctions imposed in retaliation for his having exercised his First
Amendment right of access to the courts violates due process.  The District Court,
viewing the issue as a retaliation claim, held that it was not cognizable under § 2241.
Claims brought under § 2241 must challenge the execution of a sentence, rather
than its validity.  See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 2001).  The precise
meaning of the term “execution of a sentence” has not been determined.  As we noted in
Woodall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2005), the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004), and Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973), determined that § 1983 provides no remedy in “conditions of
confinement” cases where the claims asserted lie “at the core of habeas.”  Id. (also citing
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002)).  But the Supreme Court did not address
when a prisoner is precluded from filing a habeas petition.  Woodall, at 242.
We question whether a retaliation claim is cognizable under § 2241.  Although it is
conceivable that, in certain circumstances, evidence of retaliatory motive on the part of a
charging officer and a disciplinary hearing officer might be relevant to the question of
whether a particular disciplinary adjudication violated due process pursuant to § 2241, we
need not decide the issue in Speight’s case.  Assuming arguendo that Speight’s retaliation
claim is cognizable under § 2241, he failed to properly exhaust the issue through the
4appropriate prison channels.
A federal prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies before petitioning for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to § 2241.  Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98
F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996).  Proper exhaustion requires that a petitioner assert an issue
or claim at every administrative level.  If a petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies due to a procedural default, and the default renders the administrative process
unavailable to him, review of his § 2241 claim is barred unless he can show cause and
prejudice.  Id. at 761.
Speight’s § 2241 petition alleges that Counselor Simmons knew of Speight’s
pending civil rights suit against other officers at FCI-Allenwood.  According to Speight,
Simmons retaliated by deliberately failing to respond to Speight’s informal complaints
about the loss of his eyeglasses and lack of medical treatment for injuries sustained from
an unexplained fall in March 2005.  Speight spoke with a Warden twice about Simmons’s
failure to respond to him.  After Speight’s second talk with the Warden in May 2005,
Simmons had a heated conversation with Speight at his cell, prompting Speights to retort
“see you in court.”  That same day, Simmons pressed disciplinary charges against
Speight, claiming that he hurled a racial slur at Simmons.
Although the underlying facts of the retaliation claim were known to Speight at the
time that the disciplinary charges were brought in May 2005, he did not assert the claim
in his written response to the disciplinary charge, nor did he testify to the facts underlying
the retaliation claim at the disciplinary hearing.  Speights did not raise retaliation as an
  Because the claim is procedurally defaulted, we do not reach the arguments2
Speight raises in his Reply addressing the merits of the retaliation claim.
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issue in his regional appeal.  He mentioned retaliation for the first time at the final stage
of his administrative appeal.  Because he failed to raise the retaliation claim at every level
of the administrative process, he has not properly exhausted the claim for § 2241
purposes.  Moreover, the BOP administrative process is no longer available to him, and
thus he is barred from raising the claim unless he can show cause and prejudice.  Speight
does not claim that the prison prevented him from raising the retaliation issue at the
disciplinary hearing or on appeal.  Accordingly, we conclude that the retaliation claim
was properly dismissed as procedurally defaulted.2
We turn to Speight’s bias and weight-of-the-evidence claims, which are properly
brought in a § 2241 habeas corpus petition.  Specifically, Speight argues on appeal that
DHO Bittenbinder lacked impartiality because he was a named defendant in a civil rights
action Speights filed.  He also claims that Bittenbinder wrongly relied on Counselor
Simmons’s disciplinary report to find him guilty of misconduct and wrongly disregarded
testimony from two inmates on Speight’s behalf.  The inmate witnesses were Speight’s
cellmate, PettyJohn, who was in the cell at the time that Speight and Simmons had their
argument, and inmate Steward, who was housed in a cell located down the row. 
According to Speight, PettyJohn and Steward testified that Speight did not utter the racial
slur that Simmons alleged.
As a prisoner facing a deprivation of a liberty interest in a prison disciplinary
  Speight does not make any claims as to the other procedural safeguards under3
Wolff: (1) advance written notice of the charges and underlying evidence; (2) an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (to the extent compatible
with the needs of the prison); (3) aid from a fellow inmate or staff representative, if
inmate charged was illiterate or if the issues were complex; and (4) a written statement by
the factfinders describing the evidence relied on and the reasons for disciplinary action
taken.
6
hearing, Speight is entitled to procedures sufficient to ensure that his interest in his good
time credits was not arbitrarily abrogated.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557
(1974).  Specifically, he had to be afforded certain minimal procedural protections,
including, inter alia, an impartial tribunal.   See id. at 563-72.  In addition, to comport3
with the requirements of due process, the decision of the disciplinary hearing officer had
to be supported by “some evidence.”  See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454
(1985).  The “some evidence” standard does not require examination of the entire record,
independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.  Id.
at 455-456.  “The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.”  Id. at 456.
As the District Court correctly noted, the disciplinary hearing record, specifically
the charging officer’s report, although meager, constitutes some evidence supporting the
DHO’s decision in Speight’s case.  We also agree with the District Court that even though
DHO Bittenbinder was named in one of Speight’s lawsuits, he did not lack the necessary
impartiality to preside over Speight’s disciplinary hearing in this matter.  “[T]he
requirement of an impartial tribunal prohibits only those officials who have a direct
personal or otherwise substantial involvement, such as major participation in a
judgmental or decision-making role, in the circumstances underlying the charge.” 
Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 612
F.2d 766, 773 (3d Cir. 1979).  If a prisoner could disqualify hearing officers through
instituting lawsuits against them, a prison’s ability to conduct disciplinary hearings would
be seriously compromised.  See Redding v. Fairnan, 717 F.2d 1105, 1113 (7  Cir. 1983). th
Here, there is no record evidence that Bittenbinder had any personal involvement in the
circumstances underlying Speight’s charge.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court judgment.
